Fire Lieutenant John Costanza
As we begin the New Year, 2009
will mark a couple of significant events for the Framingham Fire Department.
In a few short weeks, a new Fire Chief will begin his tenure. This Fire Chief
was hired from outside of the department and comes at a turbulent time, not
only with the economy being in such a dire condition, but the internal strife
between the administration and the rank and file is at an all time high and
moral is at an all time low. This new Fire Chief will certainly face many
challenges ahead so let’s welcome him aboard with a commitment to work
with him and help the department succeed.
This year will also mark the 30th anniversary of a line of duty death of one
of our own. On March 18, 1979, Fire Lieutenant John Costanza died in the performance
of his duties at a structure fire at 337 Concord Street. While there are still
a few of us around who remember John and the fire, most of us have no idea
who John Costanza was and what happened on that Sunday morning 30 years ago.
John grew up in Saxonville the 7th of 9 children born to Sicilian immigrants.
He attended Framingham High School and upon graduation, entered the United
States Air Force. Soon after his discharge he became an airline mechanic for
Trans World Airlines at LaGuardia Airport in New York. At the time, TWA did
not have a maintenance facility in Massachusetts and the commute to New York
was too much and kept him away from his family. A devoted family man, especially
to his mother, he took the fire department entrance exam to be closer. He
worked for the Post Office until he was appointed to the department in 1965.
John was married to Mary and together they had two children, John and Wendy.
By all accounts he was a worker who needed to be busy. It did not matter what
needed to be done at home or at the fire station. No matter what type of call
the company was on, he was in the middle of it so it came as no surprise that
he would be working at this fire. In 1976, he achieved his first promotion
to the rank of Fire Lieutenant.
John was the officer in charge of Engine Company 6 that tour. Framingham was
still working the 10’s and 14’s then and this was to be his last
tour as a Fire Lieutenant. He was once again being promoted and was to report
for duty the next day as a Fire Captain.
The first alarm assignment to this fire consisted of Engines 5 and 6, Tower
1 and Car 5 (Shift Deputy’s designation then) out of Concord Street
and Engine 3 out of Hollis Street. The staffing on this day consisted of an
officer and three firefighters on Engines 3 and 6, an officer and two firefighters
on Engines 5 and two firefighters on the Tower.
Framingham did not regularly staff their ladder companies with officers as
they do today.
To give you some perspective on the structure and where it was, 337 Concord
Street is just a couple of house lots north of the intersection of Everett
Avenue and Concord Street. It is next to the structure where we have recently
had two working fires in the past 6 months. A newer duplex to the left (bravo
side) of 331 Concord Street now occupies the lot where the original structure
stood. It was a two and one half story wood, balloon frame constructed house
and the inside configuration was very similar to the house next door. The
fire was in the void spaces created by this type of construction and very
difficult to get at. Heavy fire was showing on the upper floors with thick,
brown smoke issuing from everywhere.
Engine 5 would have been first due and positioned in front of the building.
The initial attack line came off them and advanced in. Engine 3 also positioned
in front of the building and additional attack lines were advanced. Tower
1 set up in the driveway to the right (delta side).
In those days Engines 4 and 6 were the “Hose Wagons” and their
primary function at fires was to supply the first due Engine with water within
their respective districts. They also handled all of the medical aid runs
in their respective districts. Once a reliable water supply had been established,
the crew would report for further assignments. At the time, it was not uncommon
for the crew to remain separated until it was time to make up and return to
quarters. The hydrant men would be left at the hydrant and the chauffeur would
assist the first due chauffeur with the connections. The officer would join
the attack in what ever manner seemed most appropriate.
Engine 6 dropped the two back step men at the hydrant on the corner of Pond
Street and laid two 2 ½ inch lines into Engine 5. When the two back
step men completed making the hydrant, they walked up to Engine 6 now parked
at the corner of Everett Avenue and Concord Street to retrieve their air packs
and tools. They then made their way to the front porch where they were met
by Lieutenant Costanza. He brought them over to Tower 1 and paired them up
with the Tower crew. He then returned to the structure alone.
It is unclear exactly how, where and/or why John entered the building, but
he remained unaccounted for most of the incident. It is important to note
that John’s radio was out of service for repairs this day and he was
wearing a compact, 15 minute air pack that the officers used known as a “sling
pack”. The firefighters were outfitted with the 30 minute air packs.
As the incident progressed, the supply of air bottles ran out and after some
debate, all members were ordered out of the structure.
According to Lieutenant Bob Foley there was no universal evacuation signal
in effect at the time so this order was, for the most part, word of mouth.
Lieutenant Foley was assigned to Engine 6 as a Firefighter this tour and was
only on the job for 7 month when this fire occurred.
“Bottles were being shuttled out to be refilled. Eventually they were
unable to fill anymore.” “They (the Chief and Deputy Chief) went
back and forth about whether we should be inside or out. We were eventually
ordered out”
When it was assumed that all members were out of the structure, exterior defensive
operations began with hand lines and an aerial master stream from the Tower
being put into operation. When the heaviest of the fire was knocked down,
crews reentered the structure and began the overhauling process. Still there
was no indication that John was missing however at some point it became clear
that no one had seen him. The Deputy began to transmit over the radio and
word quickly spread that they were looking for him. He was found in a third
floor front bedroom, under a pile of debris and the door to that bedroom,
approximately two hours after the fire began.
While we can not accurately account for what happened, it can be surmised
that he became disoriented because the door to the bedroom had closed behind
him and with only a handle on the outside provided no landmark. With the limited
supply of air he had, it was quickly exhausted when he could not find his
way out and he was unable to call for help as his radio was being repaired.
His helmet and face piece were located in separate corners of the room indicating
that he continued to search for the exit. When the ceiling collapsed, it trapped
him behind the door where he was later found however he most likely was overcome
by the Carbon Monoxide prior to this event.
Interior companies did make a push into that third floor bedroom early on.
While it appears that the ceiling had already come down, the door was forced
off the hinges and fell over the debris concealing him from that company.
During the ensuing days, weeks and years many inquiries were made and many
decisions were questioned. Today, NIOSH, NFPA and other agencies will formally
investigate line of duty deaths; however this did not take place for this
incident. It is easy to say that any line of duty death, short of those that
occur as a result of unexpected and unpredictable events, is un-necessary
and criminal and it is easy today to look at the staffing and the fire ground
practices of the time and say this was predictable but it was how business
was done then.
The North East has historically been resistant to change and except for the
West Coast, (Arizona, California, etc); Formal, Structured Incident Command
and Fire Ground Management systems did not exist. Fire ground operations were
mostly everyone trying to do the right thing but with no collective incident
action plan and fire ground accountability did not exist as we know it today.
What would make this tragedy a crime would be that he had died in vain and
that nothing was learned from it.
So was his death in vain and did anyone learn from it? One of his colleagues
retired Deputy Fire Chief Tom Rinoldo reflects. “Johnny was one of the
many brave heroes’ of the era who collectively in giving the ultimate
sacrifice caused enough of the progressive leaders, those who took the time
to look outside of their little worlds, to take action and to begin to make
changes”.
Positive change did come to Framingham. Advances in equipment and technology
increased the personal safety of the firefighters and allowed them to perform
more efficiently. Better drafting and enforcement of building construction
and fire prevention codes began to increase the level of fire protection within
structures.
A better understanding of the environment we work in and the strategy and
tactics needed to mitigate and manage an incident began to infiltrate the
fire service through better training. These changes and improvements were
happening nationally and were brought to Framingham by some dedicated individuals
who made it their mission to effect change in a culture that resisted it.
But with change come some challenges. The requirement of fire protective systems
for the early detection of the products of combustion, while dramatically
and rightfully increasing the survivability of occupants, has provided us
with earlier notification meaning we are arriving much earlier in the progression
of the incident. When in the past we pulled up on fire showing indicating
a flashover most likely had occurred, we now in many cases arrive pre-flashover
increasing our potential exposure to a more volatile environment. Better personal
protective equipment now fully encapsulates our firefighters. While better
protecting them from the thermal insult they are exposed to, it allows them
to advance further into the structure and potentially closer to that volatile
environment if they are not aware of the surrounding conditions and fire behavior.
Building construction codes have produced structures that are more energy
efficient and better retain the heat. They also allow for less expensive,
light-weight construction materials that are very strong when installed and
function as designed, however do not hold up well under fire conditions and
fail earlier with more catastrophic results. The composition of the interior
furnishings has also added to the challenges. The use of plastics has increased
the rate and intensity of what is burning while at the same time sharply increasing
the volume, quantity and toxicity of lethal gases present at all fires. This
means we are encountering fires that are bigger, faster, hotter and more toxic
than ever before.
Currently we are responding to a wider variety of low frequency, high risk
incidents than in previous years such as Hazardous Materials and Technical
Rescues incidents requiring us to be better educated and adaptable to a broader
spectrum of knowledge and skills.
Economic fluctuations putting
budgetary strains on cities and towns forced layoffs and reductions while
call volumes continue to increase forcing fire departments to do more with
less. Framingham was forced to deactivate two engine companies (4 and 6) and
a ladder company (Tower 1), privatize the ambulance service and decrease the
work force, down from 189 members to the current staffing of 147.
What does all this mean? It means that all of us must be more dedicated to
and educated about our profession, not just fires but in everything we are
called upon to do. The job performance requirements learned in recruit school
are only the beginning, to what must be ongoing effective training and career
development. We must eliminate the division between management and labor,
prioritize and act upon the issues that really matter. Jointly, we must work
with the city and town administrators and educate them that reduction of public
safety resources is not responsible. Everyone is keenly aware of the economic
issues but the reduction in apparatus, equipment and/or personnel could have
tragic results to both firefighter and the public. We are in this together
and through effective, cooperative communication and relevant, quality training,
the safety issues will pretty much take care of themselves.
As we reflect back on what has and has not changed within the department and
the fire service in general remember this, John Costanza did not die in vain!
While it was a very tragic and painful event in the departments’ history,
it inspired many of his colleagues to really think about this job and the
very real dangers they encounter. It inspired them to seek out training and
network with other fire service professionals throughout the country to help
ensure that everything necessary was being done to provide as safe an environment
as possible given the nature of what we do. Although this met with great resistance,
even to this day, the message was clear. “We must be proactive”.
It should also inspire all current and future members to take their responsibility
of being a firefighter, fire officer and chief officer seriously. Personal
safety begins with the individual however does not end there. We have a duty
to look out for each other and to provide whatever resources are necessary
for us to be able to do our job with the goal of going home at the end of
each shift to our families the same way we came in. We should not settle for
less than that and John’s death should be a constant reminder that we
can not!
So on March 18, 2009, take a moment to remember John and the sacrifice he
made for his family, the citizens of Framingham and for the department. Make
sure that on the 30th anniversary and beyond, the memory of Lieutenant John
Costanza is alive and well and is still inspiring new generations of Framingham
Firefighters.
Acknowledgments;
John’s sister, Carol Hubener and her husband Allen helped provide some
insight on John outside the fire department. While we so often concentrate
on the “Brotherhood”, it sometimes overshadows the real family.
The mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, husbands, wives and children we leave
behind and it is to them that we are eternally grateful for standing by us.
Carol and Allen now reside in Florida.
Fire Lieutenant Robert N. Foley was a “rookie” firefighter in
1979. He was appointed to the department in August of 1978. He was assigned
to Engine Company 6 and at the fire that day. His first hand account of the
events has helped keep the information accurate. Lieutenant Foley is currently
assigned to Ladder Company 3, Group 3. He is an instructor for the Massachusetts
Firefighting Academy and provides training for the Recruit Firefighter Training
program and the Firefighter Skills program in Rapid Intervention. He is also
an Assistant Coordinator for the Flammable Gas Training program. Lieutenant
Foley is also an examiner for the Massachusetts Fire Training Council which
oversees all firefighter training and firefighter certifications in the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts.
Retired Deputy Fire Chief Thomas J. Potenza was a Captain on Engine 1 and
off duty at the time of the incident. He reported to the scene and, with several
off duty members, stood by and observed the incident as it unfolded. It was
his input from this perspective that helped explain the management of the
incident as a whole. He was an instructor for the Massachusetts Firefighting
Academy and past president of the Massachusetts Institute of Fire Department
Instructors. He was also a long time member and instructor for the International
Society of Fire Department Instructors. He helped usher in many of the changes
that occurred within the Framingham Fire Department. Deputy Potenza retired
from the department in 1993.
Retired Deputy Fire Chief Thomas H. Rinoldo was a Lieutenant on Engine 2 and
off duty at the time of the incident. At home listening to the scanner, the
fire was only blocks from his house and he reported to the scene. He assisted
in many outside fire ground tasks including setting up an engine on a hydrant
to help provide a more reliable and sufficient water supply. A common task
today however rarely if ever performed at the time. He was an instructor at
the Massachusetts Firefighting Academy and past president of the Massachusetts
Institute of Fire Department Instructors. He was also a long time member and
instructor for the International Society of Fire Department Instructors. He
was an instructor in the Division of Continuing Education for Quinsigamond
Community College and Middlesex Community College teaching “Fire Service
Hydraulics” in the Fire Science Degree Program. He was a long time Town
Meeting member, serving on the Capital Budget Committee and on the Town Mapping
Committee. Shortly after his retirement he was appointed to and served on
the Town of Framingham Finance Committee. Along with Deputy Potenza, he helped
usher in many of the changes that occurred within the Framingham Fire Department.
Deputy Rinoldo retired from the department in 1993.
The author, Fire Lieutenant Thomas J. Rinoldo was 13 years old at the time
of the fire. He is the son of Retired Deputy Fire Chief Thomas H. Rinoldo.
Appointed to the department in December of 1993, Lieutenant Rinoldo is currently
assigned to Platform Company 1, Group 1. He is an instructor for the Massachusetts
Firefighting Academy and provides training for the Recruit Firefighter Training
program and is one of the lead instructors and former Assistant Coordinator
of the Technical Rescue Training program. He is also an examiner for the Massachusetts
Fire Training Council which oversees all firefighter training and firefighter
certifications in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Lieutenant Rinoldo is
also a member of the International Society of Fire Service Instructors.
